Approaching disruptive behaviour as learning by Zsuzsa Millei & Maiju Paananen

There has been concerning news about an increase in aggressive and disruptive behaviours of young children in kindergarten. Fingers are pointed to parents, teachers, children’s nature, the media or a changing society. Many families enrol children into preschool to learn social skills with their peers[1]. It is however rarely considered that behaving as expected in a new setting and with new people requires learning. The same way, misbehaviour, thus, could form a part of these learning processes of how to be with others in these educational environments.

Many times a finger is pointing to parents, who are claimed to neglect teaching children good behaviour. Others argue that it is the media that teaches children violence. Educational psychologists easily evaluate teachers as lacking appropriate skills, approaches or techniques to keep children under control and promote positive school environments. Yet again others, locate the problem in the social background, biology or personality of particular children. For example, teachers may act differently to children based on their skin colour.

Much of the advice directed at improving children’s behaviour focuses squarely on eliminating so called problem behaviours. This often happens through labelling children or devaluing teachers and parents. What happens if we consider ‘bad behaviour’ as an instance of learning or voicing something that is important for a child in a particular context. It becomes possible to move away from our strong urge to fix quickly what we first perceived as a problem behaviour and refocus the issue: What children can or like to accomplish through those acts?

The first issue that we need to immediately set aside is that behaviour is something that is independent from learning. The general assumption is that first every child needs to behave so learning can take place. This way of looking at the issue separates learning and behaviour.

In an example situation we show how assumptions about ‘bad behaviour’ and strategies to eliminate those might operate and how we can refocus our view of the event as part of children’s learning.

Miriam (3 years old) often goes into her room and closes her door after forcefully stressing ‘No one should disturb me’. Once a crayon drawing appeared on the wall. As she was asked about those drawings she said:

Miriam: ‘George did those drawings. He is very naughty. You should tell him off’. She says all this with a straight face.

George is an adult family friend who sometimes looks after Miriam and her sister and on those occasions he slept in Miriam’s room and Miriam slept in her sister’s room. When George came next to visit, Miriam confronted him:

Miriam: ‘Why did you draw on my wall? It is not nice, you know’.

George, knowing he did no such thing, started to laugh but didn’t protest. Miriam seemed content with this outcome.

A possible response to this scenario would likely have us concerned about this child’s behaviour. First, she possibly drew with crayons on the wall in her room. Second, she blamed someone else for her transgression. In other words, it would have us understand the scenario in terms of deceit and manipulation that could ignite a long discussion or punishment so this will not happen again.

Another option is to examine the example from the perspective of learning. If we understand behaviour-as-learning, our reading of this child could be that she playfully and quite competently explores the transgression of rules. She demonstrates that she knows very well that drawing with crayons on the wall is ‘naughty’, as she immediately knows how to name the culprit. She also demonstrates that she knows that in order to successfully blame someone else, she needs to be able to keep a straight face (not let on that she is lying). She also shows that she knows that in order for her story to hold, the culprit needs to be someone who has, in fact, had the opportunity. Further, she appears to also know that this kind of transgression requires some form of confrontation, which she carries out next time she sees her chosen culprit. As such she manages to create a credible story and to follow up on it, which is a highly complex task for a three-year old! Young children are faced with the complex task of figuring out when ‘pretend stories’ are acceptable (to adults) and when they are not, and if they get it wrong, to bear the consequences of being called a liar or deceitful. Adults around children could recognise these as competencies and act upon them.

Understanding this event this way has little to do with keeping control or winning power games. This literacy would acknowledge children’s competence in reading events and others’ actions, instead of their shortcomings. Yet, teachers feeling of need to keep control is something that can’t be overlooked. Teacher’s decision-making in an institutional context is like solving a Rubik’s cube: the daily life of the preschool resembles a combination puzzle with around 43 quintillion possible positions, with finding an optimal solution being complicated by the fact that every move affects the other parts and the following moves as well. Teachers make arrangements to cover the absence of other staff members because of sick leaves, they have conversations with other children, they supervise the yard to be sure that everyone is safe, they provide materials and equipment that children express they need, they have meetings with special education teachers, speech therapists, or with parents, they mind when they need to finish their meal so that kitchen staff are able to finish their shift on time, they give advice to substitutes and try to take into account wishes of parents. Like in solving a Rubik’s cube, it is impossible to engage in an act that would not have an influence on some other acts as well.

Engagement with children requires time to reflect and think through possible actions and also enough leeway to make situational changes to plans in the everyday life of kindergartens. In the busy lives of kindergartens this might not always be possible. What we need to think about is how to change the situation so that teachers are able to find time and possibilities to support children in learning to be social. In case those behaviours that we deem inappropriate occur, the first questions should be: What do children try to achieve with those acts? What competencies are they demonstrating and what are they in the process of learning?


Zsuzsa Millei is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Social Research, University of Tampere, Finland. She has widely published on discipline, including a book titled: Re-Theorizing Discipline in Education. This blog contains part of her article co-authored with Prof Eva Bendix Petersen published in the Emotional and Behavioural Difficulties journal[7].

Maiju Paananen is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Faculty of Education, University of Tampere, Finland. She has done research on teachers’ decision making in preschools. Her dissertation Imaginaries of early childhood education in a transnational era of accountability illustrated how governance systems of early childhood education take part in formulating everyday life of preschools.

[1] Kronqvist, E. L. & Jokimies, J. (2008). Vanhemmat varhaiskasvatuksen laadun arvioijina: Tuloksia Vaikuta vanhempi-selvityksestä. Raportteja/Stakes: 22/2008.


Is there populism in Russia? by Marianna Muravyeva

Russian populism is something nobody denies, not critics of the current regime, not its supporters. Political leaders openly appeal to the ‘people’ as the group in whose interest they are acting. However, what is important to remember that a) it has been the case for quite some time; b) Russia did not truly engage into neoliberal ideology of any kind; and c) every political party in Russia, including the opposition, use populism as a viable ideology.

However, some scholars think that Putinism is an imperfect fit to populist ideologies as Vladimir Putin did not come into power thanks to his populist platform. He was ‘an ‘annointed’ successor to President Yeltsin who stepped down leaving him to rule the country. Putinism represents a platonic model of autocracy, in which populism an inherent part of the official discourse (Oliker 2017). At the same time, despite the circumstances of his coming to the office, Putin had to go through the elections, for which he came up with a populist program. Populism also became the ideology for his newly founded United Russia party.

What is populism a-la-Rus?

There are three components of the official populist discourse: 1) sovereign (democracy)/sovereignty to account for current relationships with others; 2) traditional values to deal with social problems; and 3) patriotism to provide for national unity.

Phillip Casula identifies several characteristics of Russian populism as main features of political discourse. Firstly, the populism comes ‘from above’ but not ‘from below’, it is not oppositional but systemic. Secondly, it relies heavily on being structured around a name (Putin or Navalny), which acts as a nodal point, sort of an empty signifier. Therefore, populism works as an attempt to split the political space into two camps ‘with us’ and ‘against us’ both in domestic and foreign policy fronts (Casula 2013, p. 7). The concept of sovereignty comes very handy here; it is interpreted not a positive creative concept for better territorial and political development, but as a negative concept of defence against all types of corruption. Traditional values and patriotism work along the same lines.

Depoliticization is a flip side of populism. In the Russian case, it introduces management as the key procedure in politics (Makarychev 2008). The leadership attempts to declare objective (national) interests such as economic efficiency (anti-sanctions) or demographic revival (anti-LGBTQI and pro-heterosexual family) as a rebuttal of any ideology. Political conflicts are presented as economic, technical questions. Thus, Russian obvious support for Trump has been often portrayed as a wish to have a ‘businessman’ not a ‘politician’ (such as Clinton or Obama) to deal with.

Parapolitics is another key feature of Russian populism. It aims at deantagonization of politics. At the inscription of oppositional demands and the cooption of dissidents. The United Russia party (and political leadership) use the following strategy: they take some pragmatic elements form the liberals (especially in economy), some from the left (wages, strong employee protection etc.), some from the nationalists (patriotic discourse), and some from conservators (traditional values and preservation of stability). It makes opposition parties redundant or pushes them to be even more populist as official leadership as in case of Navalny, who organised his campaign around the fight with corruption and exposing how corrupt Russian leaders are.

To conclude, current Russian populism is a ‘catch-all’ ideology. It is rather effective and resilient. It does work miracles both in within the country and abroad as Putin’s name figures in the speeches of both far-right and far-left populist parties. Answering the panel’s questions, though, in the Russian case, populism is not a reaction to neoliberal ideology but rather an effective management strategy that came about in the dire situation of economic, political and ideological transformation, which means that as far as works as a stabilising discourse it will continue to be employed by the political leadership. As to what happens next, much depends on the ability of neoliberal ideologies to self-reform and address those issues that ‘the masses’ see as a failure.


Casula, P. (2013). Sovereign Democracy, Populism, and Depoliticization in Russia: Power and Discourse during Putin’s First Presidency. Problems of Post-Communism60(3), 3-15.

Makarychev, Andrey S. (2008). Politics, the State, and De-Politization. Problems of Post-Communism 55(5), 62–71.

Oliker, O. (2017). Putinism, Populism and the Defence of Liberal Democracy. Survival59(1), 7-24.


Marianna Muravyeva is a Senior Research fellow of the Institute for Advanced Social Research at the University of Tampere and Professor of Law at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. Her research focuses on gender, criminology, family violence and human rights.


Neoliberalism and Populism in Turkey by Mahmut Mutman

The Turkish case shows that the universally accepted model of “neoliberal rule-populist response” is more complicated than it seems. The story of neoliberalism in Turkey goes as far back as 1980 military coup. The simple reason behind the coup was the impossibility of implementing the neoliberal economic program and austerity measures accepted in the same year under democratic rule. The military junta government repressed the left opposition and immediately put into implementation the neoliberal economic program by appointing a famous economist who was the behind the neoliberal economic program, Turgut Özal, as the minister responsible for economic affairs. The same neoliberal program was maintained by the democratically elected Motherland Party government, which was indeed established and led by Özal, following the end of military rule. It must be said that by the end of the 1980s neoliberalism became the doxa in Turkey. In its first phase, neoliberalism managed the transformation of “import substitutionism” into “export oriented” economy, liberalized finances and gave a green light to privatization. It was mainly already powerful Istanbul-based industrial bourgeoisie who benefitted from privatization, deregulation and export-oriented growth. It is important to underline that Özal’s Motherland Party which governed the initial process came to power by anti-elite, anti-bureaucratic populist themes—indeed populist themes which run well with the anti-state, pro-privatization discourse of neoliberalism.

This was followed by a long period of hegemonic crisis and fragmentation of power. By the beginning of 2000s however, a new, younger generation of Islamists (R. T. Erdogan and A. Gul) established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and came to power in the 2003 elections. Islamism emerged as a directly populist movement, which characteristically divided the political space into two, declaring an enemy camp in antagonism to “the true people.” Islamist populism is thus characterized by a strong version of “nativism,” i.e. a coding of native difference as Islamic vis a vis the authoritarian secularism followed by the Republican elite. But one should further keep in mind that, like in all populist movements, Islamism is also the expression of a class difference, given that the economically dominant class, i.e. Istanbul-based industrial bourgeoisie was actually created by the statist Republican elite by a program of capitalism from above. Islamist populism is therefore a construction of class difference as religious difference, indeed as a consolidated religious difference. Therefore it would be quite reasonable to consider Islamism as a populist response to a neoliberal program implemented from above. Indeed this “class” and “anti-elite” dimension gave Islamism a strong argument of victimization. But this is only part of the story, because Turkish Islamism has also very strictly and successfully followed the neoliberal economic program already re-formulated by the previous government following a short period of economic downfall in 2001. This brings us to a significant dimension of neoliberalism in peripheral spaces such as Turkey: its promotion of “small and medium size enterprises,” the SMEs. These are often critized for providing cheap (often family and informal) labor for the multinationals (such as Gap, Nike or Mac). Although this is true, they might also be part of a process of capital accumulation. Indeed it so happened in Turkey that a new group of Islamist large conglomerates emerged out of the immense support given to the SMEs especially by the AKP government (but already by previous governments as well). Known as “Anatolian Tigers,” this new group of Islamist businessmen was represented by AKP. Turkish Islamism can therefore be described as a new hegemonic bloc formed by the Anatolian Tigers with the poor working mass, which they lead ideologically and politically. Put in loosely Gramscian terms, it is the persuasion of the working mass by the new bosses into a new hegemonic system organized in and by Islamist ideology. But this populist version of neoliberal populism led by a “conservative democratic” politics gradually turned into an authoritarian, proto-fascist populism.

As soon as it came to power in 2003, the AKP government actually followed a series of democratic reforms, apart from its strictly neoliberal stand. It thus appeared, in its initial phase, as a pro-EU, reformist, conservative or Muslim democrat party, which had support from the liberal sections of the society as well as from EU (the number of awards Erdogan had from prestigious Western and European institutions would shock anyone now). Turkey was a model country until about 2010, a laboratory in which the so-called “compatibility of Islam with democracy” was successfully experimented. AKP made a qualitative jump in the relations with EU, reformed the banking sector and gave the central bank a leading role, and battled the corruption. It also made peace with the dissident Kurdish leadership and started a process of negotiation, however slow and problematic. It also made peace with the dissident Kurdish leadership and started a negotiation process, however slow and problematic. But these successful double syntheses of neoliberalism and populism, and of democracy and Islam, did not last long. Indeed it repeated the same pattern observed in other cases of neoliberal populism such as Argentine’s Menem and Peru’s Fujimori. AKP’s reformist line has never been entirely consistent. It battled corruption and favoritism insofar as the old elite is concerned but it also developed its own favoritism and its own version of “crony capitalism”, and it constantly avoided auditing institutions and mechanisms. On the political level, AKP was successful to the extent that it was capable of governing various freedoms emerged in parallel with the rapid development of capitalism, but it seemed to reach a point where it became impossible for it to govern freedoms any longer for both politico-economic (its own corrupt practices) and ideological (its conservative, authoritarian and nationalist roots) reasons. Hence we witnessed, in the case of Turkey, a swift turn into a violent, repressive form of authoritarian populism and crony capitalism.


Mahmut Mutman teaches critical theory, media and cultural studies in the Department of Cinema and Television and is the coordinator of the M.A. Program in Cultural Studies at Istanbul Sehir University. He is the author of The Politics of Writing Islam: Voicing Difference; he has co-edited a special issue of Inscriptions titled “Orientalism and Cultural Differences” and a collection on Orientalism, Hegemony and Cultural Difference (in Turkish) as well as several articles on orientalism, nationalism, postmodernism, and film and media in Cultural Critique, Postmodern Culture, New Formations, Rethinking Marxism, Anthropological Theory, Radical Philosophy, Third Text and Toplum ve Bilim.

Populism in the shadow of neoliberalism – the Finnish case by Jorma Sipilä

As for populism, we speak of mass movements of adults, who feel severe dissatisfaction. They have lost jobs, money, security and undergone unfairness and insults by public and private institutions. All this has led to pessimism towards the mainstream culture and politics.

It is a historical norm that low paid workers do not love immigrants, be they domestic or foreign. The increase in the number of poor people pushes wages down and rents up. Immigration also tends to weaken the hard fight for better labour conditions.

Of course, all this has happened may times before – only the context is new, favouring the growth of populism. One reason for that is that the process takes place in urban and international environment and is escalated by social media. Another change is that the experience of exclusion is more collective than before: a growing proportion of people is being defined to be mentally, physically, culturally or educationally incompetent, unskilled, or unreliable.

There are always politicians ready to mobilize unhappy people. For the participants, populism is rewarding, giving hope and promising revenge.


The core of True Finns belongs to a generation that grew up in a nation, which had found new solidarity during the Second World War and the construction of the welfare state.

Politics of inclusion was in many ways particularly strong in Finland until the 1990s when the frame of the national project became too narrow for business elite.

True Finns, however, are only mildly critical towards the financial elite. Why are they attacking the left? First, they have to recruit among people who because of their social status have previously given their support to the left. Second, they get backing from the failure of leftist poverty politics.

The socialist alternative has not attracted older people after the failure of communism, whereas social democrats look toothless for them. This view has gained strength since the end of 1990s when social democrats were still the strongest political party. Its right wing leaders together with the conservatives turned their back to the people, who needed basic services and basic income security. The decline of poverty policies led to losses especially among people who were dependent on universal benefits – small entrepreneurs, long-term unemployed, housewives.

Social democrats stuck to cooperate with the labour unions. Downgrading the tax rate was preferred, although this happened at the expense of the financial transfers to municipalities, which provide the basic services for education, health, and social care. This has remained the penetrating logic in public expenditure: Because of the ageing and the maturation of the pension system the employment pensions must grow. Their growth is politically well protected and so is the freezing of the tax rate, as well. When pension contributions have been decided to be counted as taxes, there is no alternative to the retrenchment of public services.

Thus, the supporters of True Finns have reasons to be angry with the comrades, who do not show solidarity. As well known, they also show contempt towards the young red-greens, whose worldview is far away from that of the True Finns.

What will happen next?

Will we return to the era of mass parties and democratic politics?  I do not think it could happen without an international cultural revolution like that in the 1960s. Of course, such a return is possible in principle: the global financial power system is not a military fortress but a political creation that may be politically shaken.

If we really wanted to solve the underclass problem, we would fade out the boundary between the middle class and the underclass. Nordic countries have shown that it is possible, to some extent. Some of them are still doing it – Finland and Sweden do not.

The major problem is that in welfare capitalism underclass alone is a small political force. To improve the position of underclass, another political force has to join and promote inclusiveness. The position of middle class is however labile; in the eyes of the middle class the existence of underclass is both useful and problematic. It produces personal services at low cost, but it also is a source of social problems and malfunctioning in the society.

Sometimes the middle class needs political allies. In some Western countries (e.g. Greece, U.S.) the situation of middle class has worsened so much that a coalition between the middle class and underclass is more plausible than before.


I’d also like to play with an unlikely alternative. Is it possible that equality generating public policies might be accepted under neoliberalism? This sounds crazy: neoliberalism was born as an ideology of inequality. On the other hand, the powerful driver of neoliberalism is international capital.

We have an enormous amount of empirical research proving that social equality promotes economic growth and the growth of the capital. This suggests the radical conclusion that the capital should not identify itself with the personal interests of the finance folk but, for its own benefit, to demand as equal development of human resources as possible. Capital income is not maximized in the conditions of extreme inequality and lack of social investments. On the other hand, only the state can take response of universal development of human resources.

At least, it is theoretically possible that in the long run the capital and the state find common interests in promoting equality. State and capital are not strange bedfellows – if they have ever been. The state monopoly of taxation is such an attractive means to increase capital income that capital cannot stuck with an ordo-liberal anti-state position. In the present welfare capitalism neoliberalism as an ideology strives to infiltrate the public sector in order to cash money into financial institutions. Does this mean that the money escapes from the citizens? Not completely, a remarkable share of capital income returns in the form employment pensions…


Jorma Sipilä is a permanent fellow of the Institute for Advanced Social Research at the University of Tampere. He specialises in welfare state, social policy, services for the elderly and children, and cash-for-care arrangements.

14th Anniversary and Alumni Reunion of The Institute for Advanced Social Research (IASR) at the University of Tampere

Welcome to our reunion and wait for our blogs on the panel theme of populism on 19 April 2017

14:15 Opening Words and an Annual Report,

Professor Risto Heiskala, Director of the IASR
14:30 Greetings from the University of Tampere

Professor Seppo Parkkila, Vice Rector for Research

14:45 NEOLIBERALISM AND POPULISM Panel- Full video is available here

Seven of our Fellows address the topic from the perspective of seven different political cultures in talks of seven minutes and answer these two questions:
(1) Should the rise of populism be understood as a misplaced revenge of the masses for more than 30 years of neoliberalism?
(2) What will happen next?

Chair: Risto Heiskala

The panelists:

The UK: Louse Settle

The US: Meyda Yegenouglu

Australia: Zsuzsa Millei –  Australia

Russia: Marianna Muravyeva

Turkey: Mahmut Mutman

Hungary: Robert Imre – Hungary

Finland: Jorma Sipilä


NB: This time we depart from the tradition and will not provide any pre-circulated material.

However, if references are needed, one useful, timely and interestingly polemical brief introduction is Perry Anderson’s column “Why the system will still win” in LE MONDE Diplomatique (see ).

Thicker introductions include the following two:

On neoliberalism: Michel Foucault: The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collége de France, 1978–79. Palgrave, 2008;

On populism: Jan-Werner Müller: What is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.

‘Universal Access’? I think not! – Australia’s Approach to Early Childhood Education and Care by Zsuzsa Millei and Jannelle Gallagher

The expansion of early childhood education in Australia to allow access to a structured and play-based early learning program to all children in the year before they enter school is meant to be a universal access policy. In 2009, the Australian Government finally got involved in early childhood education, which was previously the responsibility of states. It responded to international policy comparisons and research evidence about the economic benefits of early education for later life outcomes, particularly for disadvantaged children. One commitment the government made was a non-compulsory opportunity for every child in the year before they enter school to attend a 15 hours per week (or later 600 hours per year) quality learning program. This commitment presented Australia with an enormous task, although it seems comparably small to other countries, such as Finland, where all children have a subjective right to full-time early childhood education should their parents so decide and a pre-primary education program is compulsory for all 6-year-olds before they go to school.

The policy expansion was welcomed by the Australian professional community. The fulfilment of every child’s right to quality early childhood education, a hope the sector held for a long time, felt closer. Due to previous investments, some states achieved universal access relatively easier by the set target date of 2013. In NSW the task of providing the number of hours required and enrolling the targeted children collided with existing program structures and financing of preschools. Being responsible for all costs including staff salaries, covered mainly by fees collected from families, preschools’ and long day care settings’ financial viability depends on filling all available places. Universal access meant changing program structures (that might not fit with families’ schedules and needs) and prioritizing the enrolment of those children who attract subsidies from the Australian Government (4-year-olds and 3-year-olds coming from disadvantaged backgrounds). Other children’s enrolment, such as 3year-olds (from non-disadvantaged backgrounds) ceased to attract state subsidies, thus their families became full-fee payers. Questions began to arise: Where should those ‘subsidized’ children come from when early education is recognised mostly as care for working mothers’ children?; what to do when families already have accommodated their working hours around the operating hours in the context of a general shortage of places?; and how to attract families when woman often give up work due to salaries earned that are equal to child care costs?

Initially, the state government laid out its strategy to reach universal access mostly in financial terms. It offered subsidies to the enrolment of targeted children, so services enrolling them could make great differences in their budget balances. Some services (those that better understood the shifting and complicated changes required and had the financial skills to respond) more intentionally restructured provisions and enrolments to follow state policy initiatives. With these changes they hoped to increase their own viability, the security of work arrangements for staff, and to expand the number of available places. They were also worried that this extra funding will soon disappear since funding for the sector is in continuous ebb and flow, therefore sought to benefit as long as they could from it. Some directors also realised that this boost in funding makes early education accessible for those who benefit the most from it: disadvantaged children. Despite these laudable reasons and when calculations were made on the budget sheets, the situation looked less equitable and desirable. It seemed that the most beneficial budget for all concerned could only be reached through the denial of access for three-year-olds. This result, however, directly contradicts with the sector’s quest for quality early education for all. The ad-hoc enactment of federal initiatives by state agents, and their reactive rather than visionary policy-making, has worked against the very goal they set to themselves: universal access, in the general meaning of children’s rights to early education.

Hasty policy initiatives for universal access have dramatically shaped services’ everyday decision making. In the process, ethical dilemmas arose in a context where numbers – subsidies, budget sheets, balances – became important considerations. Addressing universal access through budgets put directors, perhaps unknown to them, in a more powerful position in policy making. By implementing state initiatives, they trialled possible ways of achieving universal access and kept the state bureaucracy informed about best solutions, that the state in turn followed. Thus, directors became policy formers, instead of being only adaptors.

Through the implementation of universal access, the state government acted with cynicism and lack of real commitment and vision, only to be seen that they were doing something. However, in this context, preschools have gained some unprecedented powers. In the spaces opened, their activism and lobbying for the right to young children’s quality early education can continue to strengthen. For example, with the launch of the new online reporting system, after hours can be reported, especially those weekend hours that filling out the universal access forms occupy. While the bureaucracy might respond that these are invalid numbers, if the sector keeps inputting them, the government might start to recognise them. Also working hours of sessional staff required to replace permanent staff members while they are engaged in professional development need to be inputted. These hours have to be seen by the government, since they must know what it costs to run a quality service. If the sector does not want to run services as the government runs its policy, the sector must now include these hours in budgets and let the government know.

The stories about the implementation of universal access in a NSW preschool is accessible through this link:

Our article intends to provoke further discussion, challenge settled processes, and illuminate ethical impasses so that international readers might also recognise similarities and synergies related to their own educational contexts. It also prompts Australian early childhood educators to act in this changed policy environment.

Zsuzsa Millei is a Senior Research Fellow at the IASR University of Tampere working on rethinking education theory and practice. See in detail:

Jannelle Gallagher is associated with Kurri Kurri Preschool, NSW, Australia.